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Abstract—Some companies are willing to execute their business
processes (BP) in the cloud for enjoying its benefits. However, they
are also reluctant because of the new security risks that using
cloud resources introduces. Security risk includes many dimen-
sions, but this work focus on preserving the privacy of the logic of
a BP deployed in a multi-cloud context by preventing a coalition
of malicious clouds to re-construct important information from
this logic. More precisely, the paper presents a BP logic privacy
metric directly supporting the evaluation of the risk a company
has its logic hacked in a particular multi-cloud configuration
Index terms— BP modelling, BP deployment in the cloud,
Security risk, BP logic privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing has emerged as a dominant technology
because it avoids upfront infrastructure costs and helps orga-
nizations to focus on their core business activities, instead of
their system infrastructure.
In this context, some companies are willing to execute,
in the same way as other software, their business processes
(BP) in the cloud for enjoying its benefits. However, they
are also reluctant for their more valuable software because
of the new security risks the cloud introduces. Security risk
can include many dimensions (privacy, integrity, availability
. . . ). In this work, we focus on a particular aspect of security
which is the privacy of a BP logic deployed on a multi-cloud
for preventing a coalition of malicious clouds to re-construct
important information by combining their BP logic knowledge.
More precisely the paper presents a BP logic privacy metric
to evaluate the risk a company has its BP logic hacked in a
particular multi-cloud configuration. The global idea is that,
on the one hand the more sensitive information is contained
in some more sensitive BP fragments, and on the other hand,
more these fragments are distant in a cloud configuration, more
the configuration is resistant to privacy leaks. The distance
between fragments is measured based on the number of clouds
on the paths between sensitive fragments weighted with the
reputation of these clouds. The metric considers not only
attacks from one malicious cloud provider, but from a coalition
of cloud providers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next
section explains the basics on which our metric is designed.
Section III describes our risk computing metric. Section IV
makes an evaluation of the proposed approach and discusses
the obtained results. Section V discusses the state of the art
and finally section VI concludes and introduces some future
work.
II. MOTIVATION, CONTEXT AND APPROACH
A. Motivating example
Figure 1 depicts1 a selection process of residents for a
hospital. The objective of this process is to accept or reject
a candidacy. Depending on the resident’s record (medical
school performed, scores, internships . . . ) the candidacy can be
accepted, refused or, in case of neutral decision, reevaluated.
The final decision is taken on the basis of the decision
notification combined with aptitude test results.
The hospital is ready to externalize its business process
execution to the cloud, however it wants to preserve its strategy
for selecting or rejecting a candidacy. In this objective, the
company managing the IT services of the hospital decides to
obfuscate the BP model by splitting its logic in a collaborations
of BP fragments to be assigned to different cloud.
B. BP obfuscation by splitting its logic
Splitting a BP model in a BP fragments collaboration, each
BP fragment being assigned to a different cloud , is a basic
idea of BP obfuscation [8] as, in consequence, each cloud
provider has only a partial view of the BP model.
To support this process, several works [8][5][1] use sepa-
ration constraints (separate(ti, tj)) for requiring a sensitive
task ti and its complementing sensitive task tj to be assigned
to different clouds.
[5] proposes an algorithm for automating the generation
of separation constraints which, if applied to our motivating
example returns the following separation constraints
1We use the BPMN (Business Process Modeling Notation
(http://www.bpmn.org)) for modeling our BP models. In addition these
process models are supposed to be well structured [12]
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Fig. 1: The resident selection Process (orchestration)
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Fig. 2: The resident selection Process as a collaboration of BP fragments
• separate(CAR,DN) • separate(ASP, FD)
• separate(NA,AA) • separate(NA,AR)
• separate(AA,AR) • separate(AA,RR)
• separate(AR,RR)
Figure 2 describes a collaboration of BP fragments obtained
by this splitting, each fragment being assigned to a different
cloud, and the fragments being connected with send and
receive messages.
In addition and for increasing the complexity of a BP frag-
ments collaboration, some works [1] add separation constraints
with fake fragments. Figure 3 describes another collaboration
of the same process while using this principle.
As the BP fragments of the process are assigned to clouds
for execution, different assignments leading to different cloud
configurations are possible. Therefore, there is a need for
comparing these configurations. This is the objective of the
metric developed in this paper
C. BP logic privacy violation risk assessment approach
While the splitting of a BP process in BP fragments and
other security artifacts (for example fake fragments) provide
active support against malicious clouds attacks, they cannot
completely ensure the protection of the BP logic and a risk
persists. Thus an important issue is to be able to measure this
risk. This is the objective of the metric developed in this paper.
Moreover this risk evaluation metric developed is directly
related to our BP obfuscation method, and thus enlightens
sensitive tasks as first class elements to be preserved from
attacks.
Its principle is that for discovering a sensitive information,
an attacker has:
• to possess both a sensitive task and the corresponding
complementing one (in other terms, to possess the tasks
ti and tj of a separation constraint separate(ti, tj)): in
the context of a BP fragments collaboration, we formalize
this risk as the ability for a cloud executing a sensitive
task to discover a path between such a sensitive task
and its complementing one, following forward the send
operation(s) of its fragment (the BP fragment it executes),
and/or backward the receive operation(s) of this fragment.
• to collude with clouds on the paths between sensitive
complementing tasks
More precisely, the metric used for measuring logic privacy
is related to number of clouds on the paths between comple-
menting sensitive tasks weighted with the reputation level of
these clouds.
III. METRIC FOR BP LOGIC PRIVACY VIOLATION RISK
In this section we explain how we compute a risk value for
a whole collaboration of BP fragments as the sum of the risk
for all sensitive tasks to be protected. The risk value for each
sensitive task is computed as the sum of the risk for all paths
between this task and its complementing one. Such a risk is
computed using the general risk formula [3] introduced just
below.
A. General definition of a risk
In general, a risk is defined by the likelihood of an incident
scenario mapped onto estimated negative impacts.
In the IT context, [3] refine this definition as the likelihood
a threat, accidentally or intentionally, exploits one or more
vulnerabilities (flaws or weaknesses in system security proce-
dures, in design, implementation, or internal controls) of the
IT environment with a negative impact (destruction, alteration,
theft, etc.).
Thus the security risk assessment on an artifact a consists
usually in evaluating the following formula:
Risk(a) = V (a)× T (a)× I(a) (1)
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Fig. 3: The BP collaboration corresponding to The Resident Selection process with fake fragment deployment
Where
• V: the vulnerability of artifact a
• T: the threat on a
• I: the impact on a
B. Risk level of a collaboration
The risk level to which is exposed the whole process (the
collaboration of its process fragments) represents the sum of
the risks to which are exposed all the sensitive tasks it includes,
and is computed as follows
Risk(collaboration) =
nb∑
i=1
Risk(ti) (2)
where
• nb: the number of sensitive tasks
• Risk(ti): the risk level of the sensitive task ti
C. Global risk level of a sensitive task (considering all paths)
The risk of a task ti is defined as the sum of the risks
following all paths to its complementing task ti′ .
A path pj(ti) between a sensitive task ti and its comple-
menting sensitive task ti′ , noted pj(ti) is the set of clouds
executing the tasks in the jth logical path between ti and ti′
in the BP logic.
Risk(ti) =
p∑
j=1
Riskj(ti) (3)
where
• p: the number of paths from ti to its complementing task
ti′
• Riskj(ti): risk for the task ti when selecting the path
pj(ti)
D. Risk for a sensitive task on a particular path pj
Accordingly to definition 1, the risk for a task ti on path
pj(ti) is defined as:
Riskj(ti) = V ulnerability(ti)×Threatj(ti)× Impactj(ti)
(4)
where :
• V ulnerability(ti) : the vulnerability of ti depends on
the cloud executing the task, or how it is ready to collude
with other clouds. This value is common to all paths.
• Threatj(ti) : the threat on a task ti or how the clouds
on the path pj(ti) are ready to collude
• Impactj(ti): the impact of a collusion of the clouds on
the path pj(ti)
1) Vulnerability of a task: As introduced above, the vul-
nerability of a BP fragment comes from the cloud executing
it, or how it is ready to collude with other clouds. In practice,
we directly relate the vulnerability of a task to the level of
reputation of the cloud deploying it, or the more a cloud has
a good reputation, the less the task will be exposed to threats.
Formally, the vulnerability of a task ti is a normalized value
belonging to the interval [0; 1] defined as follows:
V ulnerability(ti) = 1− rep(c) (5)
where:
1) ti: the considered sensitive task
2) c: the cloud deploying (ti)
3) rep(c) : the reputation of the cloud which execute (ti)
Measuring the reputation of a cloud is out of the scope of
this paper. Many approaches has been proposed for dynami-
cally measuring such a reputation [9]. Our only hypothesis is
that reputation can be normalized in [0,1], 0 the less reputed,
1 the best.
2) Threat of a task ti relatively to path pj(ti): We consider
that the threat on a sensitive task relatively to a path is related
to:
• the sensitivity2: the more a task is sensitive, and the more
malicious clouds will be motivated to attack it,
• the reputation of clouds: the better reputation a cloud has,
and the less it is ready to collude,
• the number of clouds: the more clouds in the path and
the more difficult it is for them to collude; we consider
that this difficulty evolve exponentially.
2the notion of sensitivity of a task is introduced in [10]: it is a designer
defined value assigned to a task taken in [0, 1] : 0 for the less sensitive, 1
fore the more sensitive
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This is formalized as follows:
Threatj(ti) =
st ∗ (
1
ecard(pj(ti))
∑card(pj(ti))
j=1 rep(Cj)
)
(6)
where
• st: the sensitivity of the task t (∈ [0, 1])
• card(pj(ti)) : the number of clouds in pj(ti)
• rep(cj): the reputation of cloud j
3) Impact of a threat on a task: As previously suggested,
the impact of threats can be opportunely correlated to the
number of clouds implied in an attack, i.e. the more clouds in
the coalition, the more important is the impact as each cloud
belonging to the malicious coalition can take advantage of the
flaw. Thus, we choose to measure the impact of a threat as the
rate (percentage) of clouds implied in the attack. Equation 7
gives the impact of a threat for a task ti relatively to a path
pj .
Impactj(ti) =
card(pj(ti))
cardSys
(7)
where
1) card(pj(ti)) : the number of clouds in pj(ti)
2) cardSys : the cardinality of the system, i.e. the number
of clouds involved in the BP collaboration.
IV. APPLICATION AND EXPERIMENTATIONS
To illustrate the utility and the applicability of our metric,
we apply it in a first time to our motivating example (section
IV-A) to compute the different risk levels to which is exposed a
sensitive task on different paths. In a second time, we simulate
its behavior in different execution settings (section IV-B).
Cloud Reputation Cloud Reputation
SP0 0,8 SP9 0,6
SP1 0,5 SP10 0,3
SP2 0,4 SP11 0,7
SP3 0,6 SP12 0,2
SP4 0,3 SP13 0,7
SP5 0,2 SP14 0,8
SP6 0,1 SP15 0,3
SP7 0,4 SP16 0,7
SP8 0,2 SP17 0,3
TABLE I: Cloud’s reputation
A. Example: the case of the sensitive task CAR and its
complementing one DN
To illustrate the risk model developed above, we come
back to our motivating example and we focus on the risk
that malicious clouds can link the sensitive task CAR to its
complementing one DN.
Figure 4 depicts all existing paths linking the tasks CAR and
DN. The top part of the figure depicts the paths which can be
discovered using the receive operation and the bottom part
the ones which can be discovered using the send operation.To
each path is associated its length i.e. the number of clouds it
includes. It must be noted that the task CAR is deployed on
subprocess 1 (SP1) while DN is deployed on subprocess 14
(SP14).
a) Step one: In the first step, we determine the different
paths linking tasks CAR and DN. For example, starting from
SP1 and following the send287 operation, we find the path
of length 4 composed of subprocesses (SP1−SP5−SP10−
SP14) (highlighted in bold in figure 3 and shown in figure 4,
bottom part) leading from CAR to DN.
b) Step two: After selecting the set of paths, we calculate
the risk to which is exposed the task CAR on each path by
computing the vulnerability, the threat and the impact.
For example, applying our equations 5, 6 and 7 to the
path (SP1 − SP5 − SP10 − SP14) returns respectively the
following results for CAR about its vulnerability, its threat
and their impact, while using the clouds’ reputation depicted
on table I :
V ulnerability(CAR) = (1− 0, 5) = 0, 5
Threat(CAR) = 0.7× ( 1
e
4
∑4
j=1
Rep(Cj)
)
Where C = {SP1− SP5− SP10− SP14}.
We obtain then
Threat(CAR) = 0, 7× ( 1e4×1,8 ) = 0.00052
The impact of CAR is computed as
impact(CAR) = ( 418 ) = 0, 22
Then, we compute the risk to which is exposed the task
using equation 1. The risk of CAR on path SP1 − SP5 −
SP10− SP14 is computed as
Risk(CAR) = 0, 5× 0.00052× 0, 22 = 57.10−6.
We compute the risk to which is exposed CAR on each
path of figure 4 using the same method.
After computing the risk to which is exposed CAR on each
path, we compute the global risk to which it is exposed using
equation 3.
c) Third step: After applying the same method as ap-
plied to the task CAR for each sensitive task of the process
for global risk computation, we compute the risk of the whole
collaboration using equation 2.
Risk(Collaboration) =
∑n
i=1 Risk(ti), n ∈
SetOfSensitiveTasks
B. Experimentation
To observe the behavior of our risk metric, we have evalu-
ated the risk of deploying a BP in the cloud with regards to
three deployment approaches:
1) an aleatory distribution of tasks,
2) a distribution respecting the principle of assigning com-
plementing sensitive tasks in different clouds (as intro-
duced in [5] and summarized in section II-B,
3) a distribution as the previous one but extended with fake
fragments as introduced in [1].
1) Experimental settings: All algorithms were coded in java
language. All experiments were performed on an intel (R)
Core(TM) i3- 2310M 2.10 GHz running Windows Seven.
We used different BP with a variable number of tasks. We
generate until 1000 instances of collaborations for each of
these BP and for each of the three ways of distribution.
As we were not able to find real data information (providers
do not reveal the level of reputation of their cloud servers),
we generate randomly a set of cloud reputations (table I is an
example).
2) Experimental Results: Figures 5 depicts our experimen-
tal results in terms of risk level 3 (figure a) and number
of clouds (figure b), depending on the number of tasks in
processes. As intended, they confirm:
• that configurations separating complementing sensitive
fragments are less risky that aleatory defined configura-
tions,
• the fake mechanism coupled to the previous algorithm
minimizes even more the risk until obtaining very small
values,
• the number of clouds is not correlated to the number
of activities, but to the number of sensitive tasks (this
explain why the process with 10 activities in figure 5-b
needs more clouds than the process with 14 activities.
These results confirm our assumptions i.e. separating sensi-
tive complementing fragments on different clouds minimizes
the likelihood and the risk of a coalition. Moreover, the
mechanism of fake fragments increases the length and the
number of paths separating sensitive fragments, making longer
an eventual collusion and therefore less probable.
3The risk level is normalized to scale the range in [0, 1] using the following
widespread formula x′ = x−min
max−min (x’and x are respectively the normalized
and original values while min and max are respectively the minimum and the
maximum risk values computed)
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Fig. 5: Risk level evolution with regards to deployment strategies.
V. STATE OF THE ART
The work described in this paper is related to Business
Process Outsourcing (BPO) in a multi-cloud environment.
Even if many researches have already be done in the context
of BPO [15][2], only few of them are concerned by the cloud
computing context.
Directly related to our field, Rekik and al.[13] proposed
a framework named Business Process Outsourcing (BPO2C)
covering the outsourcing process life-cycle to identify the
implied business process in the outsourcing decision. However,
this work did not consider the risk of know-how disclosure
by neither a single cloud provider nor a collusion of several
clouds.
The proposed approach of this paper comes in the continu-
ation of our previous works. In [6] we yet defined a security
risk metric but based on data given by cloud providers, while
in this current work the risk value is based on our proper
obfuscation model i.e. in other words based on data from the
cloud client himself.
Several other researches are directly concerned with the
security risk of a BP but in traditional information systems
settings[14] [7][11][4] and as such do not consider the deploy-
ment of a BP in a multi-cloud context, and less the conspiracy
of resource providers.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has introduced a metric for risk evaluation during
a BP deployment in a multi-cloud context. Its originality is
to be based on client-side data and not data given by cloud
providers, what is a better guarantee for BP owners.
Such a metric is important for cloud clients who need to
compare different deployment solutions, as at the one hand
security cannot be completely ensured, and on the other hand
the security is a parameter to balance with other quality of
services (QoS) parameters.
Our future work concerns the development of a larger
security risk metric based on our previous work in [6] and
this current work, while confronting the security dimension to
other QoS parameters.
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